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In his talk in this room an hour ago [on June 11, 2015, at the AAUP Conference on the State of Higher 
Education held in Washington, DC], John Wilson spoke against “civility,” especially as it is often used 
today, as a tool for silencing people. I was happy to hear that for a number of reasons and not simply 
because I have no plan on being civil to Stanley Fish here. I remember, too, the first time I saw Fish, on an 
MLA panel in the early 1980s where, as respondent, he took apart the views of one of the speakers, 
making mincemeat of him joyously. Fish could easily do the same to me, so I have no sense that I need to 
be easy on him. I am not fair to Fish here, and I admit that, but fairness to Fish is not something that will 
help me make my point. Treating him with a bit of incivility, however, may. Sometimes, as John says, 
incivility can be a good thing. Fish is one of the most able and intelligent academics of his generation but 
that does not mean he is always right. 
Academic Freedom Isn’t for Me 
It’s for us. All of us. Faculty, administration, staff and students. The country. A minor mistake of 
the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure of the AAUP is that it focuses on 
teachers, leaving the value of academic freedom to others unsaid. Point 1: “Teachers are entitled to full 
freedom in research.” Point 2: “Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom.” Point 3: “College 
and university teachers… should be free from institutional censorship or discipline” 
(http://aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure).  
Fortunately, as J. Peter Byrne says, few really see it that as restrictive or exclusionary: “The term 
‘academic freedom’ should be reserved for those rights necessary for the preservation of the unique 
functions of the university.” Academic Freedom, in other words, is necessary for continuation of the 
institution, not the individual. 
Stanley Fish quotes that line of Byrne’s in his recent book, Versions of Academic Freedom, using 
it to set in opposition what he imagines are two views of academic freedom, one that he calls “modest” 
and associates with Byrne. The other, to Fish, sees Academic Freedom as “a general, overriding, and 
ever-expanding value, and the academy is just one of the places that house it.” 
What Fish apparently—and willingly—does not understand is that there’s nothing “modest” 
about Byrne’s definition. ‘The unique functions of the university’ covers quite a bit of ground. What Fish 
has done is place his own meager view of education itself over the concept of Academic Freedom, 
transferring his own meager vision to Byrne. His view of higher education is of a guild of specialists, one 
awaiting customers. Though he tries to place the onus for that on Byrne, he really should keep it to 
himself. 
If we go back to John Dewey’s vision of education, however, we see that there is nothing 
modest about it, or about the “university” that Byrne assumes. Dewey writes, at the end of “My 
Pedagogic Creed”: 
I believe it is the business of every one interested in education to insist upon the 
school as the primary and most effective instrument of social progress and reform in 
order that society may be awakened to realize what the school stands for, and aroused 
to the necessity of endowing the educator with sufficient equipment properly to 
perform his task. 
I believe that education thus conceived marks the most perfect and intimate 
union of science and art conceivable in human experience. 
I believe that the art of thus giving shape to human powers and adapting them 
to social service, is the supreme art; one calling into its service the best of artists; that 
no insight, sympathy, tact, executive power is too great for such service. 
I believe that with the growth of psychological science, giving added insight into 
individual structure and laws of growth; and with growth of social science, adding to our 
knowledge of the right organization of individuals, all scientific resources can be utilized 
for the purposes of education. 
I believe that when science and art thus join hands the most commanding 
motive for human action will be reached; the most genuine springs of human conduct 
aroused and the best service that human nature is capable of guaranteed. 
I believe, finally, that the teacher is engaged, not simply in the training of 
individuals, but in the formation of the proper social life. 
I believe that every teacher should realize the dignity of his calling; that he is a 
social servant set apart for the maintenance of proper social order and the securing of 
the right social growth. 
I believe that in this way the teacher always is the prophet of the true God and 
the usherer in of the true kingdom of God. (http://dewey.pragmatism.org/creed.htm) 
Providing an opening for Fish, our mistake, today, when we defend Academic Freedom, is that 
we defend it too narrowly—though we often extol it as the savior of higher education. This allows 
people like Fish to claim that, “Although academic freedom is often celebrated in grand, indeed 
grandiose, terms, it is at base a guild slogan that speaks to the desire of the academic profession to run 
its own shop,” cynically narrowing Academic Freedom and setting up what Fish imagines is a new debate 
on Academic Freedom, one in which he defines the discussion. 
Fish provides what he calls five “schools” of academic freedom: 
1. “It’s just a job.” This one reflects Fish’s own vision. “Those who work in higher education 
are trained to impart… knowledge, demonstrate… skills and engage in research.” They 
are paid for this and nothing more.  “When engaged in those activities, they should be 
accorded the latitude—call it freedom if you like—necessary to their proper 
performance.” Though Fish does not say it, this view reduces education to a commodity. 
However, as Hunter Rawlings argued in The Washington Post this week: 
college is not a commodity. It’s a challenging engagement in which both 
parties have to take an active and risk-taking role if its potential value is 
to be realized. Professors need to inspire, to prod, to irritate, to create 
engaging environments that enable learning to take place that can’t 
happen simply from reading books or watching films or surfing the Web. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/06/09/colle
ge-is-not-a-commodity-stop-treating-it-like-one/ 
Fish says he may be the only one supporting this version, and he may be right—within 
academia, that is. 
2. This version of academic freedom, that it is “For the common good,” is the one Fish 
associates historically with the AAUP. In this one, “professional values are subordinated 
to the higher values of democracy or justice or freedom; that is, to the common good.” 
To me, this is a reductive view of the AAUP position and of Dewey’s vision of education. 
It reflects his narrow assumption about the scope of educational endeavors. 
3. Fish’s third version is, he says, an extension of the second. In his rather snide depiction, 
its proponents see themselves as “uncommon, not only intellectually but morally.” They 
are the elite and must have special rights. He transfers a view of institutions of higher 
education onto the educators. It is the colleges and universities that are uncommon—in 
the sense that they are not “free market” entities. 
4. In this version, academic freedom is important because “academics have the special 
capacity to see through the conventional public wisdom and expose its contradictions.” 
Here again, Fish is simply being snide. This “school” sees academic freedom “as a 
protection for dissent and the scope of dissent must extend to the very distinctions and 
boundaries the academy presently enforces.” In reality, it is a protection for institutions 
through the individuals involved. 
5. In this version, much of what is implicit in #2 and #3 becomes explicitly revolutionary, its 
protection a protection for the genesis of necessary social change. Here, Fish sees the 
institutions of higher education as envisioned as the laboratories for social change, a 
simplistic vision of what is actually a much more complex relationship between the 
university and society. 
It seems to me that Fish, in his presentation of these “versions” of academic freedom, is a 
deliberate narrowing of any definition of the role of the faculty and, by extension, of institutions of 
higher education, moving all of it down to “service” alone by ridiculing the other versions. He never 
substantively addresses the needs lying behind academic freedom, the cultural needs for vibrant 
institutions of higher education. In fact, he reduces everything to the terms of his first version, which is, 
of course, the one he likes best. 
What has made this possible is a diversion of the debate over academic freedom made possible 
by the newer vision of the university as a corporate-style entity producing and marketing something of 
demand. Period. End of story. The idea that universities do more than the equivalent of making and 
selling televisions is, to the Fish vision, laughable. 
Thing is, we on the faculty—along with our institutions—do a lot more than that, much of which 
Fish makes it hard to defend as a result of his veiled sarcasm.  
We don’t need to go as far as Dewey’s vision of the role of the school to justify academic 
freedom. All we need to do is define higher education adequately. And that definition, of course, does 
not reflect a business model. Frankly, education was never meant to be a business and, when it is so 
defined and constricted, it begins to fail. Fish’s meager vision of academic freedom is a contributor to 
that failure, so it has to be rejected. His other four versions are couched in similar terms—or in terms of 
the rights of the individual, also a bankrupt model for academic freedom as it is for higher education in 
general. He further limits his discussion of academic freedom: 
I do not… say much about tenure, unionization, the rise of contingent faculty, the 
decline in the funding of state universities, the rewards and perils of partnerships with 
industry, the impact of technology, the changes in the world of publishing, the culture 
wars, terrorism, or globalism. Each of these has a relationship to academic freedom that 
deserves, and has often received, extended attention. But not here. 
This exclusion is not justified, not here and not in his book. Academic freedom is part and parcel of what 
makes American colleges and universities as a whole successful. To limit discussion as he does is to deny 
not only the fullness of academic freedom but to limit it by definition, not by actual usage, to what he 
has already decided is simply a guild right. 
Just as the fourth estate grew over the nineteenth century into a model that managed to keep 
its business aspects separate—to at least some degree—from its journalistic side, a model of higher 
education also developed in American society, though more so in the latter part of the century. In those 
days, not everything had to be based on a “free market” model. Over the past few years, both 
journalism and academia have succumbed to pressures from what some call the neoliberal forces of 
modern society. Academic freedom, in the current environment, is protection for an institution of grand 
tradition from market forces. It’s also a necessary cultural force combatting the laziness of unexamined 
belief, something stultifying for all cultures and certainly, as Lee McIntyre writes in The Chronicle of 
Higher Education, is a growing part of American culture. McIntyre writes that, today: 
The real enemy is not ignorance, doubt, or even disbelief. It is false knowledge. 
When we profess to know something even in the face of absent or contradicting 
evidence, that is when we stop looking for the truth. If we are ignorant, perhaps we will 
be motivated to learn. If we are skeptical, we can continue to search for answers. If we 
disbelieve, maybe others can convince us. And perhaps even if we are honestly wrong, 
and put forward a proposition that is open to refutation, we may learn something when 
our earlier belief is overthrown. (Lee McIntyre, http://chronicle.com/article/The-Attack-
on-Truth/230631/) 
Academic freedom is an institutional motivation for continuing to learn. It’s not an individual 
right at all. As Larry Gerber said this morning, it—like the closely connected “tenure”—is a right 
designed for the public good, not simply the private good, as Fish seems to assume. 
In general, over the past generation, we have moved away from idealism to a slavish obedience 
to another myth, that of the triumphal efficacy of “market forces.” Anything else is now seen as naïve 
and antique. In his determination to see academic freedom as a personal right for guild members, Fish 
buys into the commodification of education, to its reduction to an item for trade. We have seen where 
this goes. Corinthian Colleges and the Pakistani company Axact. What these corporations have been 
doing is only the logical extension of modeling our colleges and universities on neoliberal corporatist 
paradigms of the sort Fish, consciously or not, promotes. 
